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ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BEHIND BARS:
THE BOUNDARIES OF DUE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2002, in Gerber v. Hickman,' the en banc court for
the Ninth Circuit held that the fundamental right to procreate was
inconsistent with the nature of incarceration. 2 In so holding, the
court overturned an earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the constitutional right of procreation survives
incarceration.3 Because the latest decision by the court relies on a
ruling by a widely divided court,4 questions have arisen regarding the
correct analysis for determining whether a fundamental right endures
imprisonment.
II. COURTS REVIEW PRISONERS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PROCREATE
A. Gerber's Claim
William Gerber is serving a life sentence without the likelihood
of parole.5 Pursuant to California's three strikes law, his sentence
stemmed from his conviction in 1997 for discharging a firearm and
making terrorist threats. 6 Gerber and his wife wanted to have a child,
and time was of the essence since his wife was already forty-four
years old.7 Since Gerber did not have the right to conjugal visits and
was unlikely to get parole, he wished to impregnate his wife by
artificial insemination.8 Gerber requested that:
1. 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. See id. at 623.
3. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en
banc, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
4. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 617.
5. See Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
6. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 884.
7. See Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
8. See id.
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(1) [A] laboratory be permitted to mail him a plastic
collection container at the prison along with a prepaid
return mailer, (2) he be permitted to ejaculate into the
container, and (3) the filled container be returned to the
laboratory in the prepaid mailer by overnight mail.
Alternatively, [he] requests that his counsel be permitted to
personally pick up the container for transfer to the
laboratory or health care provider.
9
Even though Gerber was willing to pay all costs for the
procedure, the prison warden, Robert Hickman, denied his request.
10
Gerber claims that the warden's denial violated his constitutional
right to procreate."
B. Procedural History
Gerber filed a complaint in the Eastern District Court of
California. The district court first determined, pursuant to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,'2 that the right to procreate is a fundamental
right. 13 Relying on Turner v. Safley, 14 the court further found that
"[n]ot all rights, however, survive incarceration, and even those that
do are subject to significant restrictions."1 5 Finally, the district court
relied on the reasoning in Anderson v. Vasquez 16 and Goodwin v.
Turner17 and held that the right to procreate does not survive
incarceration.' 8 Consequently, the district court dismissed Gerber's
complaint.
19
Gerber appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit.
The court of appeals reviewed the district court's decision and
employed a two-step analysis to determine whether Gerber's
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See id. Gerber asserts that his constitutional right stems from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. See Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
14. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
15. Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
16. 827 F. Supp. 617, 618 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
17. 702 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
18. See Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1216-18.
19. See id. at 1218.
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substantive due process rights were violated. 20 First, the appellate
court decided whether the right to procreate is a fundamental right
'"[consistent] with [Gerber's] status as a prisoner."' 21 Second, if the
court found that the fundamental right survived incarceration, the
question was "whether there are legitimate penological interests
which justify the prison's restriction of the exercise of that
fundamental right."
22
Using this two-step analysis, the court of appeals found that the
right to procreate is a fundamental right23 and that it survives
incarceration.24 The appellate court inferred the survival of
procreation from the decisions in Turner and Skinner v. Oklahoma.
25
Turner held that the right to marry survives incarceration (with some
restrictions),26 and Skinner held that sterilization is unconstitutional
because prisoners are able to maintain their procreative abilities once
they are released from prison.27 The court found that these cases
support the idea that procreation is retained in some form while in
28prison.
The court of appeals then assessed whether the governmental
interests that the warden articulated fit within the Turner test.
Specifically, the court asked whether legitimate penological interests
existed that were reasonably related to the prison prohibition of
artificial insemination.2 9  The Turner court listed four factors to
determine the reasonableness of the interests. 30 The first factor was
whether there was a "valid, rational connection" between the
20. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
21. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
22. Id. at 887.
23. See id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois., 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
24. See id. at 889.
25. See id.
26. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
27. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
28. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 888-89.
29. See id. at 890.
30. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91 (deciding that the governmental interests
the warden cited to did not meet the first factor of the Turner test and,
therefore, the court did not need to analyze the other three factors). But see
Gerber, 264 F.3d at 892.
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prohibition and the interest.31 The governmental interests that the
warden articulated were equal treatment of men and women
prisoners, safety risks, and cost concerns due to the threat of
lawsuits.
32
1. First factor: gender equality
The warden argued that treating men and women equally
requires granting women the right to artificially inseminate. This
would be both costly and create other "'obvious' and 'prohibitive'
burdens., 33 The court of appeals, however, did not have to deal with
the merits of the warden's claim. The court took the position that
men and women can be treated equally in this instance because "the
two sexes are not similarly situated. 34 The appellate court narrowly
tailored Gerber's request. The court interpreted the request as
providing semen in a cup, which is something a woman cannot
request.
3W
2. Second factor: security
The court of appeals reasoned that the warden's security concern
that prisoners would misuse the semen seemed argumentative.
36
However, there is no real threat of prisoners throwing their semen on
other inmates or guards or sending their semen through the mail to an
unsuspecting individual.37 In fact, Gerber's lawyer offered to pick
up the container from the prison and deliver it to the laboratory.
38
3. Third factor: cost
Lastly, the court of appeals held that the interest of cost was not
legitimate because there was no evidence that women would bring
costly lawsuits claiming the right to be artificially inseminated while
in prison.39  Further, the court took the position that banning a
31. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
32. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890.
33. Id. at 891.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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constitutional right due to fear of an increase in lawsuits is
reprehensible.4 °
Thus, the court held that the warden's rationales were not
"'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests' ... [and]
there [was] no 'valid, rational connection' between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it."' 41 The court of appeals reversed the lower court and
remanded for further consideration.
42
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS REHEARING EN BANC
The court of appeals' decision incited negative reactions.43
Consequently, the decision was vacated and reheard by the en banc
court in order to determine whether inmates have a fundamental right
to procreate. The en banc court agreed that the two-part analysis that
the court of appeals employed is applicable. 44 Thus, the court first
determined "whether the right to procreate is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration., 45 If so, then the regulation would
stand.46 If not, then the question would be whether "the prison
regulation abridging that right [is] reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. 47
40. See id. at 891-92.
41. 1d. at 892 (citations omitted).
42. See id. at 892-93.
43. "The California Attorney General's office said this ruling has 'cast the
lower courts into hopeless conflict, created a right that is unprecedented under
Supreme Court case law, and triggered ramifications that will far exceed the
bounds of the case."' Sarah L. Dunn, Note, The "Art" of Procreation: Why
Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows For the Preservation of Female
Prisoners' Right to Procreate, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2561, 2592 (2002)
(quoting Greg Krikorian, State Fights Procreation for Prison Inmates Courts:
Lockyer Moves to Block an Appellate Ruling on Artificial Insemination, Saying
the U.S. Supreme Court Should Decide Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001 at
B 1).
44. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2002).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
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A. Looking at Case Law: Does the Right to Procreate Apply to
Prisoners?
In determining whether the right to procreate survives
incarceration, the en banc court first established that prisoners have
fundamental rights, but that restrictions on these rights may be
necessary.48  The court then looked at Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,49 which held that the right of intimate association is
restricted in the prison setting.50 This case established that a prisoner
has no right to conjugal visits. The court also reviewed the holding
in Goodwin v. Turner,51 a case involving a similar request as that of
Gerber. In Goodwin, a prison inmate sought assistance in artificially
* 52inseminating his wife. The Goodwin court decided, as discussed in
Turner v. Safley,53 that "[a]rtificial insemination, as a method of
begetting a child, [fell] within [the] realm of unavailable 'incidents
of marriage.'
54
The court also rebutted the earlier decision that Skinner and
Turner, taken together, lead to the presumption that inmates have the
right to procreate. 55 Skinner held that prisoners cannot be forced into
surgical sterilization, 56 but the court took the position that this does
not mean they can procreate while still in prison.57 Further, the court
48. See id. "'[W]hile persons imprisoned... enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the.., loss of
many significant rights."' Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524
(1984)); see, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
49. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
50. See id. at617-18.
51. 702 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
52. See id.
53. Turner discussed incidents of marriage that survive incarceration such
as emotional support, exercise of religious and spiritual faith, personal
dedication to spouses, and receipt of governmental benefits. Turner also
determined that, since most inmates will get out of prison on parole, the
expectation that the marriage will eventually be consummated is an incident of
marriage. See 482 U.S. at 95-96. Goodwin implied from this language in
Turner that incarceration restricts the right to procreate. Goodwin, 702 F.
Supp. at 1454.
54. Goodwin, 702 F. Supp. At 1454.
55. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2002).
56. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
57. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622.
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held that Turner made it clear that marriage must be restricted with
regard to its physical aspects.58 Accordingly, the court found that the
right to procreate does not survive incarceration.
59
B. Policy Considerations
Additionally, the court looked at policy reasons such as
deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation in making its decision that
procreation is inconsistent with imprisonment.60 Although the court
never stated why prohibiting artificial insemination serves these
penological objectives, it cited Hudson v. Palmer and State v. Oakley
for its determination that restrictions on procreative rights serve these
goals. 61  The court also addressed the nature of artificial
insemination. 62  The court adopted the position that the ease or
difficulty of artificial insemination is not consistent with the goals of
the penal system for deterrence purposes.
63
The court did not need to consider the second part of the
analysis since it found the right to be inconsistent with
imprisonment.64 Thus, the court held that the right to procreate via
artificial insemination does not survive incarceration.
65
IV. CRITICISM OF THE COuRT'S DECISION
A. What the Court Should Have Done: Applied One Test
While the en banc court's conclusion may be sound, its
reasoning is somewhat suspect. Following precedent, the court
58. See id. at 623.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 622.
61. See id. at 621. "'[Tlhe curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of 'institutional needs and
objectives' of prison facilities.... ."' Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 524 (1984)). "'[Incarceration, by its very nature, deprives a convicted
individual of the fundamental right to be free from physical restraint,' and this
'in turn encompasses and restricts other fundamental rights, such as the right to
procreate."' Id. (quoting State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209 (Wis. 2001)).
62. See id. at 622.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 623.
65. See id.
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should have applied the four-factor analysis highlighted by the
Supreme Court in Turner.
66
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
created to protect individuals against deprivation of their
fundamental rights.67 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the en
banc court both recognized that the right to procreate is an
established fundamental right.68 The en banc court had to decide
whether it is a fundamental right that is inconsistent with
incarceration, 69 which is where the two courts are split. The court of
appeals found that it is consistent and, therefore, that the penological
interests must be tested.70 The en banc court, however, reasoned that
case law implicitly held that the right to procreate is inconsistent
with incarceration, and thus the interests need not be tested.7'
The Gerber courts should have applied a different analysis.
Rather than breaking up the analysis into two tests, they should have
applied one test using the Turner factors to determine whether
legitimate penological interests cause imprisonment to be
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. There is no precedent
for the courts' actions. Furthermore, the courts have not provided a
reason why incarceration is inconsistent with the right to procreate.
B. Turner v. Safley and the Four-Factor Reasonableness Test
In Turner, the Supreme Court held that heightened scrutiny does
not apply to prisoners' fundamental rights violations.72 Instead, the
Supreme Court advanced an intermediate standard, much like that
which applies to gender cases involving the Equal Protection
Clause.73 The Turner Court stated that "when a prison regulation
66. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
67. See Dunn, supra note 43, at 2594.
68. The Gerber courts cited to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); and Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
69. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 620.
70. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623.
72. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
73. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying an
intermediate standard to determine the legitimacy of the state male and female
drinking ages).
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impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 74  The
Supreme Court applied a four-factor test to determine
reasonableness:
First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it .... Moreover, the
governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral
one ....
A second factor relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a prison restriction.., is whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates....
A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally ....
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of
the reasonableness of a prison regulation.75
The four-factor reasonable relationship test was subsequently
used by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Goodwin v. Turner.
76
As mentioned earlier, this case involved facts similar to those of
Gerber. The Goodwin court determined that it was not necessary to
decide if the right to procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with
incarceration because, according to application of the four-factor test,
the restriction on procreation is reasonably related to legitimate
correctional interests.
77
The en banc court should have followed Turner and Goodwin
78
and applied the four-factor test instead of concluding that the right to
procreate is inconsistent with incarceration. As the dissent in Gerber
pointed out, the court made sweeping generalities about the nature of
74. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
75. Id. at 89-90 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
76. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1990).
77. See id. at 1396.
78. While the en banc court agreed with the holding in Goodwin, it did not
follow its reasoning and did not explain why. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291
F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2002).
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incarceration, but never applied any reasons for the fundamental
inconsistency to the facts of the case. 79  Additionally, the court
claims that it took penological interests into account when making its
decision.80  If so, those interests should have been expressed
specifically and made to withstand the four-factor test.
The court should have used the reasoning in Goodwin to find
that the prohibition on artificial insemination is valid. The court
chose to focus on the district court's reasoning in Goodwin rather
than the decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is
good law.8 1 In Goodwin, the court cited several prison interests
including the burdens and expenses of treating men and women
inmates similarly.82 Likewise, the warden in Gerber asserted the
interest of treating men and women equally, along with safety
concerns when collecting semen and costs of adjudication for
potential suits related to the procedure.
83
The Gerber court should have balanced the penological interests
against the four-step Turner analysis, as the Goodwin court did. The
first consideration is the interest of treating men and women alike.
84
In step one, the objective underlying the regulation must also be
neutral, legitimate, and rationally related to that objective. 85 in
Goodwin, the court found that step one86 was satisfied. Equal
79. These generalities included citations to cases and governmental
interests that were never applied to the facts of the case. See id. at 624.
80. See id. at 620.
81. The district court's reasoning was disregarded in the en banc court's
decision. See id.
82. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400. The Goodwin court held that all the
other interests asserted by the prison were not relevant to Goodwin's specific
request to artificially inseminate his wife. See id.
83. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. The court skirted the issue of treating men and women equally by
indicating that men and women are biologically different and thus, the equality
of the sexes is not an issue. See id.; see also Jeri Munsterman, Procreation
From Prison via Fedex and the Extension of the Right to Imprisoned Women,
70 UMKC L. REV. 733, 740 (2002) (arguing that Goodwin's right to procreate
should survive incarceration). On remand, however, the court of appeals did
not address the issue specifically. Because this equality issue is an interest that
the warden cited to, it must be measured against the reasonable relationship
test of Turner.
85. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890.
86. "There must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it."
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treatment of the sexes is a neutral and legitimate objective that is
required under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The
Goodwin court reasoned that allowing a man to procreate would
force the prison to allow a female inmate the same right, and a
pregnant prisoner would require:
'special medical services which may or may not be
available within the institution, special diet, exercise, and
other pre- and post-natal care.' ... Therefore, pursuant to
Bureau policy of treating all prisoners the same, to the
extent possible, male prisoners cannot be allowed to
procreate while incarcerated because the Bureau cannot
afford to expand its medical services for its female
prisoners to accommodate their desire to procreate.87
The second consideration is whether there are any alternative
means of exercising the right to procreate. 88 There are clearly no
other viable options of procreation since Gerber does not have the
right to conjugal visits. 89 However, the fourth step of the Turner test
states that "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation." 90 As the court in Goodwin
stated, "The lack of such alternative avenues stems from the fact that
none can exist without compromising prison policy or expending a
large amount of prison resources accommodating the requests of its
female prisoners. This absence of ready alternatives constitutes
evidence of the reasonableness of the Bureau's policy."
91
The last consideration is whether the right to procreate will have
a substantial impact on other inmates, guards, and prison resources.
92
As the Goodwin court reasoned in step one, allowing women the
right to procreate by artificial insemination would create a substantial
burden on prison resources. 93 Specifically, it would divert resources
away from the interests of inmate security and facility upkeep.94
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
87. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400.
88. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
89. See Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
90. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
91. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400.
92. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
93. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400.
94. See id.
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Additionally, guards would have to give special treatment to the
pregnant inmate.
95
Allowing this kind of procedure would create a "ripple effect"
that would burden the entire prison system.96 Thus, applying the
analysis of the Turner Court with the reasoning of the Goodwin
court, the regulation imposed in Gerber should be upheld.
97
Although not binding, the Goodwin reasoning is extremely
persuasive and should have been applied by the Gerber court. By
implementing the Goodwin analysis, the court would invoke a
rational approach rather than an arbitrary analysis that gives no
guidelines for future decisions. The explicit policy concerns and
penological interests are so "inexorably intertwined with the initial
question whether a right exists" 98 that without applying the Turner
test an accurate conclusion cannot be reached. The court clearly
wanted to find the prohibition valid and relied on scattered precedent
to reach such a conclusion.
V. THE FUTURE OF GERBER V. HICKMAN
The en banc court did not provide future courts with an
applicable standard to use when determining whether a fundamental
right is inconsistent with incarceration. Further, if the Gerber
decision is reviewed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
decision will likely be overturned. Alternatively, its reasoning is
likely to be discredited because the court failed to provide reasons
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. The interest of treating men and women the same is the only interest the
Gerber court cites to that would survive step one of the Turner test. There are
no other legitimate safety concerns because the process only requires a
container and permission to ejaculate into that container. As the court of
appeals noted, it would be too attenuated to suggest that there would be any
security issues since the prisoner is not making contact with any other inmates
or his non-inmate spouse. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891. The interest of
avoiding costly litigation by female prisoners wanting to have a child (or due
to mishandling of semen) is also not rationally related to the specific request of
Gerber because, as the court in Goodwin points out, it has nothing to do with
prison administration. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400.
98. Recent Case: Constitutional Law-Due Process-Prisoners' Rights
Ninth Circuit Holds that the Right to Procreate Survives
Incarceration-Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d. 882 (9th Cir. 2001)., 115 HARV.
L. REv. 1541, 1545 (2002).
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specific to the regulation against artificial insemination. The court
should have set the standard in the Ninth Circuit and applied the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasonable relationship test in Turner to determine
whether there are legitimate penological interests that make the
fundamental right inconsistent with incarceration.
While Turner actually states that a prisoner "retains those
[constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system," 99 other courts have interpreted it as the standard
for which to conclude whether a constitutional right is inconsistent
with incarceration. For example, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the
Turner test as the appropriate standard for reviewing a prison
restriction on an inmate's fundamental constitutional right. 100 In
order to make a rational decision, the Gerber court should have
followed the Eighth Circuit's lead and applied the Turner test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether through traditional means or artificial insemination,
having a child is a fundamental constitutional right. Prisoners,
however, are only afforded those fundamental rights that are
consistent with incarceration. Therefore, the issue is which rights
survive incarceration. The test to determine whether or not a right
survives imprisonment should be the reasonable relationship test
implemented in Turner. Since the court in Gerber did not apply this
test and instead relied on generalities, it undermined its opinion and
resulted in an inadequate response to the concerns of dissenters.
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